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I. INTRODUCTION
In The Dark Knight Rises, the final installment of the Batman Dark
Knight Trilogy, Selina Kyle-aka Catwoman-strikes a deal with the devil: she
agrees to aid the terrorist Bane in defeating Batman in exchange for receiving
access to technology that, purportedly, will eliminate not just her criminal
record, but all record of her existence, in every database worldwide.' As one
film critic wrote, "[s]he's motivated not just by self-interest, but a more visceral
disgust at a world where people have no chance to redefine themselves,
whether they're teenagers who've posted something dumb on social media,
depressive billionaires [like Bruce Wayne], or talented criminals trapped by
THE DARK KNIGHT RISES (Warner Bros. Pictures 2012). In an interesting example of art
imitating life, Warner Bros. was sued by Fortres Grand Corporation who alleged that the film's
reference to the "clean slate" product sought by Catwoman constituted trademark infringement
with regard to Fortres's actual software program called "Clean Slate." See Fortres Grand Corp. v.
Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-535, 2013 WL 2156318 (N.D. Ind. May 16, 2013).
Fortres Grand's Clean Slate software was designed to "protect[] the security of computer
networks by erasing all evidence of user activity so that subsequent users see no evidence of a
previous user's activity, meaning that each new user starts his or her computer activity with a
'clean slate."' Id. at *1. The district court disagreed with Fortres Grand's trademark infringement
allegation, holding instead that there was no infringement because Warner Bros.'s product was a
film, not software. In other words, when faced with the question, "is it trademark infringement if
a fictional company or product in a movie . .. bears the same name . . . as a real .. . product?,"
the court answered in the negative. See id. (citing 6 McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 31:149 (4th ed. 1996)).
498 [Vol. 116
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss2/4
2013] REGULA TORY TAKINGS AND REPUTATIONAL DAMAGE
past misdeeds." 2 Catwoman's choosing to work with Bane illustrates how
highly she prized the chance to regain control over her identity. In other words,
her choice evinces the notion that a person's "good name" or reputation3 has
value beyond measure, as a reflection of the community's opinion of her
character.4
Like the fictional Selina Kyle, real individuals with criminal records
face daily life with destroyed or diminished reputations. As a result of this
damage, those who carry the stigma of criminal conviction suffer, not just
socially,5 but also economically, 6 and even psychologically.7 Their degraded
reputations are a collateral consequence of their convictions that consigns them
to forever live with the stigma of "ex-offender status,"8 without the hope of
restored reputation.9
2 Alyssa Rosenberg, Why Ann Hathaway is the Best Catwoman Yet, SLATE (July 24, 2012,
12:21 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2012/07/24/whyannehathawayis-the-best
catwomanyetin the dark knight rises.html (last visited Sep. 25, 2013).
3 See OXFORD DICTIONARIES (2d ed. 2010), - available at
http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american english/reputation ("Reputation" is defined
as "[1] the beliefs or opinions that are generally held about someone or something: [e.g.,] his
reputation was tarnished by allegations that he had taken bribes; [2] a widespread belief that
someone . . . has a particular . .. characteristic.").
4 See id.
David Wolitz, The Stigma of Conviction: Coram Nobis, Civil Disabilities, and the Right to
Clear One's Name, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1277, 1312 (noting the detrimental change to social status
that results from criminal conviction).
6 See Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America "The Land of Second
Chances ": Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-Offenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
527, 535-39 (2006) (discussing, among other impediments, the myriad limits to legitimate
employment options for individuals with criminal records). See generally THE PEW CHARITABLE
TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION'S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY (2010),
available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic_
Mobility/Collateral%20Costs%20FINAL.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2013).
ROBERT M. PAGE, CONCEPTS IN SOCIAL POLICY Two: STIGMA 13-18 (Vic George & Paul
Wilding eds., 1986).
8 Increasingly, scholars, lawyers, activists, and previously convicted persons themselves find
the term "ex-offender" to be pejorative. See, e.g., Victoria Pynchon, Shame by Any Other Name:
Lessons for Restorative Justice from the Principles, Traditions and Practices of Alcoholics
Anonymous, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 299, 312 n.85 (2005) ("One is not, of course, an 'offender,'
or an 'ex-offender' but an individual who has been convicted of committing a crime.
Nevertheless, society stigmatizes such individuals as being ex-offenders, which often leads those
individuals to incorporate offending into their own self-conception."); see also McGregor Smyth,
Holistic is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense Attorney's Guide to Using Invisible
Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 479, 479 n.1 (2005) (noting that "out
of respect for . . . [the previously convicted] client communities and recognizing the power of
language, [his] article will "endeavor to avoid the use of labels such as 'ex-offender,' 'ex-
prisoner,' and 'felon'); Wolitz, supra note 5, at 1312 ("We have words such as criminal,
convict, ex-con, offender, etc., each of which suggests the negative social status resulting from
conviction."); Eddie Ellis, Founder, Ctr. for Nu Leadership on Urban Solutions, An Open Letter
499
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In the United States, there is currently neither the right to nor the
expectation of restored reputation for those who have been adjudicated guilty
of a criminal offense.10 The British legal system has sanctioned a form of
"rebiography" in that it provides for one's criminal record to "expire" over time
and with continued good behavior, thus allowing the previously convicted
person to disavow her criminal history." One scholar notes that "[w]ithout this
right [of rebiography], ex-offenders will always be ex-offenders, hence
outsiders, or the Other."l 2
Most current discussions of collateral consequences 3 of criminal
conviction, reentry barriers and discrimination against those with criminal
records center on one of two notions: (1) the fairness (or the lack thereof) of
continued, unforeseen, or disproportional punishment; 14 or (2) the role of
to Our Friends on the Question of Language, available at
http://www.centerfornuleadership.org/CNUS-background.pdf (Mar. 13, 2012) ("In an effort to
assist our transition from prison to our communities as responsible citizens and to create a more
positive human image of ourselves, we are asking everyone to stop using these negative terms
[such as "inmates, convicts, prisoners and felons"] and to simply refer to us as PEOPLE. People
currently or formerly incarcerated, PEOPLE on parole, PEOPLE recently released from prison,
PEOPLE in prison, PEOPLE with criminal convictions, but PEOPLE.").
The author also recognizes the term "ex-offender" as pejorative and, therefore, throughout
this Article uses terms such as "previously convicted" and "formerly incarcerated" to refer to
those who bear "ex-offender status" (the author avoids the term "formerly convicted" because
she finds it to be inaccurate). This Article will use the term "ex-offender status" to refer to the
negative status of having been convicted of or having pleaded guilty to a criminal offense, but
will avoid using "ex-offender" when referring to persons or classes of persons.
9 See infra Part II.
10 JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 215-16,
219 (2009). Even the wrongly accused have little hope of a full restoration of their former
reputations, as former U.S. Secretary of Labor Ray Donovan noted when, upon acquittal of fraud
and larceny charges, he famously asked, "Which office do I go to to get my reputation back?"
Selwyn Raab, Donovan Cleared of Fraud Charges by Jury in Bronx, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1987,
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/26/nyregion/donovan-cleared-of-fraud-charges-by-jury-in-
bronx.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (last visited Sept. 25, 2013). See also James B. Jacobs &
Daniel P. Curtin, Remedying Defamation by Law Enforcement: Fall Out from the Wen Ho Lee,
Steven Hatfill and Brandon Mayfield Settlements, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 223 (2010) (noting that
since 1976, "there seemed to be no possibility that individuals wrongly accused ... would be
able to recover damages against the government . . . via constitutional tort litigation").
" SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: How Ex-CONvICTS REFORM AND REBUILD THEIR LIvES
164 (2001).
12 Id. at 165.
1 As explained in Part II, collateral consequences are the legal penalties that attach to
convictions, such as ineligibility for public benefits, government-assisted housing and
employment. See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 277, 288-89 (2011) (listing various collateral
consequences and noting their impact even in misdemeanor cases).
14 See, e.g., Archer & Williams, supra note 6 at 535-39 (examining the various
socioeconomic collateral consequences of ex-offender status); Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing
500 [Vol. 116
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legislatures and the executive (in the guise of administrative agencies) usurping
the sentencing function of the judiciary through the imposition of collateral
consequences. This Article posits that there is an even more powerful
argument to be made against the many collateral consequences. It focuses on
the idea of reputation as property and reconceptualizes the damage to
reputation suffered by the previously convicted as a government taking of
private property for which just compensation is due. Thus, it seeks to tie this
idea of rebiography to an actual substantive "rebiography right," stemming
from the inherent value of reputation as property and, thus, the taking of it as
constitutionally cognizable. It further argues that such a focus renders it
necessary to examine the powerful role that stigma plays in criminal
punishment and the potential of destigmatization to restore reputation as "status
property"' 6 to the previously convicted in order to remedy this government
taking.
In an early scene of The Dark Knight Rises, Selina Kyle laments that,
"There's no fresh start in today's world," and that her life choices are,
therefore, severely restricted by her criminal past.17 It is this restriction that is
the essence of the "status property" taking. A legally recognized rebiography
right would prove this notion wrong by promoting the removal of stigma,
revival of character, restoration of reputation and, ultimately, the reclamation
and resurrection of self. In this manner, rather than merely being released into
the mainstream population, the formerly incarcerated person will have the
Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 153, 154 (1999) ("[c]ollateral sentencing consequences have contributed to exiling
ex-offenders within their country, even after expiration of their maximum sentences"); Michael
Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and
Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REv. 623 (2006)
(exploring reentry issues and urging the application of holistic lawyering principles to issues
relating to reentry); Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 585 (2006) (chronicling housing, employment and voting rights barriers faced by ex-
offenders); Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45
B.C. L. REV. 255 (2004).
1s See generally Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 16 (Marc
Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
6 Most simply put, "status property" is that property which is linked to identity. It is "a
reputational interest that endows the owners with certain privileges flowing from a public
conception of their identity and personhood," and "that can be both analogized to conventional
forms of property and literally converted to those forms." Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126
HARV. L. REv. 2151, 2154, 2159 (2013) (citing Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1734-37 (1993)). See infra Part II.A for an additional discussion of the
definition and evolution of "status property."
17 THE DARK KNIGHT RISES, supra note 1 ("Once you've done what you had to, they'll never
let you do what you want to.").
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opportunity to become a part of mainstream society by being properly
compensated for the taking.
Part II of this Article reasons that stigma functions as a collateral
consequence of conviction that attaches to "offender status" and describes the
negative effects of stigma attachment that are suffered by those with criminal
records. Part III applies a regulatory takings analysis to the reputational damage
suffered by the previously convicted and concludes that reputation is a form of
"status property." Part III further argues that continued stigma attachment and
damage to reputation constitutes a "taking" without just compensation. Finally,
Part III articulates the idea of affording a "rebiography right" as just
compensation to the previously convicted. Part IV explores "rebiography"
through the lens of the personality theory of property, examines the issues
inherent in defining the parameters of such a property right, and briefly
examines the limits of process in actually affording a rebiography right to
reentering individuals with criminal records. This Article concludes by arguing
that including the restoration of reputation in reentry efforts will serve to
remove a barrier to reentry-namely degraded reputation-thereby increasing
public safety by reducing the chances of recidivism.
II. STIGMA AS A COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE OF INCARCERATION
In order to elucidate the idea of reputation as property in the reentry
context, one must examine the damage to reputation that is caused by criminal
conviction at the outset. One must also examine the ongoing nature of that
damage, even after one's sentence has been served. This Part defines stigma as
a collateral consequence of conviction that is similar to traditional collateral
consequences in its debilitating effects on the previously convicted person's
ability to gain the necessities for daily living and to reintegrate herself into the
fabric of society.
A. The Expansion of the Definition of "Collateral Consequences"
The "collateral consequences" of criminal convictions are those that,
rather than having been imposed upon the convicted individual by a sentencing
judge, "take effect outside of the traditional sentencing framework ... by
operation of law [and are, therefore] not considered part of the practice or
jurisprudence of sentencing."18 Traditionally, collateral consequences have
been defined as civil disabilities imposed by non-judicial actors such as
legislatures and administrative agencies. 19 They include, for example,
limitations and prohibitions on the franchise, and exclusions from public
18 Travis, supra note 15, at 16.
9 JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL CoME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER
REENTRY 63-64 (2005).
502 [Vol. 116
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss2/4
REGULATORY TAKINGS AND REPUTATIONAL DAMAGE
benefits, public housing, loans and grants for higher education, occupational
and professional licenses and certain employment.20 Judicial actors may be
involved, however, because collateral consequences include both "collateral
sanctions"-those "legal penalt[ies] ... imposed on a person automatically
upon that person's conviction" 21-and "discretionary disqualifications"-
"penalt[ies] ... that a civil court, administrative agency, or official is
authorized, but not required to impose on a person convicted of an offense."2 2
The notion that collateral consequences are civil in nature and administrative in
their promulgation has been reinforced by the Supreme Court of the United
States, which has consistently treated collateral consequences as regulatory
and, thus, civil, rather than punitive and, therefore, criminal in nature.23
The Supreme Court classifying collateral consequences as nonpunitive
survives despite its decision in Padilla v. Kentucky.24 The Padilla Court held
that criminal defense counsel's failure to inform her client of whether a guilty
plea carried the risk of deportation amounted to ineffective assistance of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment.25 One scholar has argued that this holding
signals the Court's recognition of deportation as more akin to direct, and thus
punitive, consequences than collateral consequences.2 6 The view of this
20 See generally Pinard & Thompson, supra note 14, at 586-87.
21 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATIONS OF CONVICTED PERSONS § 19-1.1(a) (3d ed. 2004),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublishing/criminaljustice section-newsletter/cri
mjust standardscollateralsanctionwithcommentary.authcheckdam.pdf. "Collateral sanctions"
include, among other sanctions, deprivation of the right to vote, to serve on a jury, to inherit
property, and to participate in governmental programs or receive governmental benefits. See id. §
19-2.6.
22 Id. § 19-1.1(b). "Discretionary disqualifications" include disqualifications from "benefits
or opportunities, including housing, employment, insurance, and occupational and professional
licenses, permits and certifications." Id. § 19-3.1.
23 See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 104-06 (2003) (required registration under the Alaska
Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA) did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because such
registration did not constitute punishment); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)
(Criminal alien removal proceedings "are civil, not criminal, and . .. nonpunitive."). But see Doe
v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1015, 1012, 1019 (Alaska 2008) (determining that the registration
required under the ASORA is punishment and therefore violative of the state constitution's ex
post facto clause, and holding that the provision allowing dissemination of a registered person's
criminal history "resembles the punishment of shaming").
24 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
25 Id. at 374.
26 See Anita Ortiz Maddalia, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New Chapter in Supreme Court
Jurisprudence on Whether Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent
Residents?, 61 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 5 ("While the Court refrained from classifying deportation as a
direct or collateral consequence of a plea, its description of deportation seemed to suggest that
deportation is a direct consequence of a plea and, therefore, part of the criminal punishment
imposed."); id at 24 ("[T]he Court's dictum suggests that deportation more closely resembles a
direct consequence rather than a collateral consequence.").
2013] 503
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particular consequence as punitive, or at least as quasi-criminal, arguably opens
the door to classifying other traditional collateral consequences as punitive. The
Court, however, adhered to precedent, noting that deportation, including that
resulting from an adjudication of guilt in a criminal proceeding, though
"intimately related to the criminal process," is "not, in a strict sense, a [direct]
criminal sanction," but rather "civil in nature." 2 7
The civil-criminal distinction notwithstanding, scholars have been
gradually expanding the definition of what constitutes a collateral consequence
of conviction to include virtually any negative effect that takes place outside of
the traditional sentencing framework.2 8 This expansion has resulted in the term
being applied to informal, non-legal and social consequences of incarceration,
which necessarily include stigma.29 Moreover, the Su reme Court has long
taken notice of the stigma of criminal conviction.3 It is, therefore, not
surprising that Justice Samuel Alito, in his concurrence in Padilla, after listing
the "wide variety of [collateral] consequences" 31 of a criminal conviction, went
on to note that "[a] criminal conviction may also severely damage a defendant's
reputation."32 Given this broader focus on the social impacts of collateral
consequences, damage to reputation and the attachment of stigma, though not
directly imposed by any court or administrative agency, must also be classified
as collateral consequences of conviction. Arguably, "ex-offender status" acts as
a "master status"-an attribute that eclipses all other attributes, positive and
negative, of the carrier33-and may morph into what could be termed a "master
27 559 U.S. at 357, 365.
28 Wolitz, supra note 5, at 1312 (arguing that "[in addition to the formal civil disabilities
affecting . . . a convicted person . . . , we must also consider the non-legal collateral
consequences of conviction [e.g., stigma] . . . [because] a conviction has social meaning and
[negatively] changes a person's social status").
29 Id
30 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) (noting that even the conviction of a
misdemeanor imposes stigma, as such a crime "remains a criminal offense with all that imports
for the dignity of the persons charged, including notation of convictions on their records and on
job application forms"); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997) (noting the "opprobrium and
stigma of a criminal conviction"); Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 302 (1996) (referring
to the "societal stigma accompanying any criminal conviction").
31 559 U.S. at 376 (Alito, J., concurring) ("This case happens to involve removal, but criminal
convictions can carry a wide variety of consequences other than conviction and sentencing,
including civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, disqualification from
public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces,
and loss of business or professional licenses.").
32 Id.
33 "The master status of an individual is one which, in most or all social situations, will
overpower or dominate all other statuses .... Master status influences every other aspect of life,
including personal identity. Since status is a social label and not a personal choice, the individual
has little control over his or her master status in any given social interaction." JOHN Scort &
GORDON MARSHALL, A DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY (3d ed. 2009), available at
504 [Vol. 1 16
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collateral consequence" in that stigma attachment is, at least in part, the
rationale and result of many of the other traditionally recognized collateral
34consequences.
B. Stigma, Its Attachment and Its Effect on the Previously Convicted
A stigma is a "socially inferior attribute" that marks the carrier as one
who deviates from prevailing social norms, notwithstanding whether such
deviation is intentional.s In his groundbreaking writing on stigma, sociologist
Erving Goffman wrote that society "believe[s] the person with a stigma is not
quite human [and that] [o]n this assumption we exercise varieties of
discrimination, through which we effectively .. . reduce his life chances."36
This has never been more true than with regard to those stigmatized by ex-
offender status.
Scholars classify the stigma carried by those with ex-offender status as
"conduct" or "moral" stigma, which taints the carrier as one possessing weak
character.3 8 Such stigma is distinguishable from the two other types of stigma,
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/I0.1093/acref/9780199533008.001.0001/acref-
9780199533008-e-1365 (defining "master status"). See also TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING
COMMUNITIES: How MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE
(2007) ("It is clear that being convicted of a crime and sent to prison carries a stigma, and being a
criminal can become a person's master status."). The concept of "ex-offender status" as a
"master status" is explored further in Part II.A. 1.
34 Scholars argue that the continued attachment of stigma to ex-offender status does not serve
any sound theory of punishment. See, e.g., Demleitner, supra note 14, at 154. Most collateral
consequences operate automatically, discretionary disqualifications notwithstanding. This
automatic, non-individualized operation may apply equally to violent and non-violent offenders,
thus any deterrent or preventative effect is thwarted. Moreover, the near universally automatic
nature of collateral consequences works counter to rehabilitative norms. Further, theories of
proportionality and thus retributive justice are also offended by the broad application of collateral
consequences, even social consequences such as stigma. Finally, these collateral consequences
themselves result in stigma (i.e., not being able to vote, etc. is stigmatizing in and of itself).
PAGE, supra note 7, at 2-6; see also Mark C. Stafford & Richard R. Scott, Stigma,
Deviance, and Social Control: Some Conceptual Issues, in THE DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE: A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY VIEW OF STIGMA 77, 80 (Steven C. Ainlay et al. eds, 1986) [hereinafter THE
DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE] ("Stigma is a characteristic of persons that is contrary to a norm of a
social unit.").
ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 5 (1963).
3 Michelle Alexander notes that "[o]nce a person is labeled a felon, he or she is ushered into
a parallel universe in which discrimination, stigma, and exclusion are perfectly legal, and the
privileges of citizenship . . . are off-limits . . . . It is the badge of inferiority . .. that relegates
people for their entire lives, to second-class status." MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 92 (2010).
38 GOFFMAN, supra note 36, at 4; PAGE, supra note 7, at 4-5, Table 1.1. As such, the
definition of "conduct stigma" has historically been identical to that of "deviance"-a norm
violation which can be "conceptualized more or less exclusively as behavior." Stafford & Scott,
supra note 35, at 81.
2013] 505
9
Jefferson-Jones: A Good Name: Applying Regulatory Takings Analysis to Reputation D
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
namely "physical" stigma related to physical deformity or disability and, so-
called "tribal" stigma resulting from racial or ethnic difference, in that those
who carry physical or tribal stigmas are not generally accorded blame for their
stigma. 9 Unlike carriers of conduct stigmas, they are usually afforded, or may
come to be afforded over time, a measure of social acceptance despite their
stigmatizing (or formerly stigmatizing) attribute. 40 By contrast, those with
conduct stigmas are adjudged blameworthy and thus less deserving of social
acceptability, because the stigma that they carry serves as proof of their
rejection of socially acceptable behavior.4'
In addition to examining the nature of a specific stigma and the process
of stigmatization or "attachment" of stigma, one must also examine the manner
in which a particular stigma is "carried" because the manner in which a stigma
is carried either renders the bearer "discredited" or "discreditable."4 2 Those
whose stigmas render them "discredited" are those whose stigmatizing attribute
is already known or whose stigma is "immediately obvious to others."43 The
stigma of conviction attaches with a very public event-a plea of guilty in open
court or a finding of guilt at the conclusion of a criminal trial.44 Despite its
having been attached in a public forum, ex-offender status, like most conduct
stigmas, is usually "discreditable"-meaning that its attachment to a particular
individual is either unknown by others or is not "immediately perceivable" by
them.45 It is at the moment of the revelation of the stigma that the individual
carrying the stigma becomes "discredited." 4 6 In order to avoid the resulting
exclusion and shame, the previously convicted person must, therefore,
3 See GOFFMAN, supra note 36, at 4 (defining the three categories of stigma); PAGE, supra
note 7, at 5-7 (discussing the three types of stigma and research regarding the blameless-
blameworthy dimension of stigma).
40 PAGE, supra note 7, at 5-7; see also Gaylene Becker & Regina Arnold, Stigma as a Social
and Cultural Construct, in THE DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE 39, 53-55 (Steven C. Ainlay et al. eds.,
1986) (discussing how tribal stigma, particularly that carried by African-Americans can and has
been affected by social movements and the resulting sociocultural shifts).
41 PAGE, supra note 7, at 6-7.
42 Id. at 5; GOFFMAN, supra note 36, at 4.
43 GOFFMAN, supra note 36, at 4; PAGE, supra note 7, at 5.
44 But see Regina Austin, "The Shame of it All": Stigma and the Political
Disenfranchisement of Formerly Convicted and Incarcerated Persons, 36 COLtuM. HUM. RTs. L.
REV. 173, 175-76 (2004). Professor Austin argues that the process of stigmatization begins with
arrest, which is also a public event. I have not included arrest, though public and potentially
stigmatizing, for the simple fact that not all arrests lead to an eventual determination of guilt and,
thus, the attachment of ex-offender status.
45 GOFFMAN, supra note 36, at 4; PAGE, supra note 7, at 5-6.
46 GOFFMAN, supra note 36, at 4; PAGE, supra note 7, at 5-6.
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continually strive to remain discreditable rather than discredited in her social
interactions. 7
Many traditional collateral consequences affect the previously
convicted person for a lifetime. 4 8 Damage to reputation is, likewise, long-
lasting. Courts have reinforced this idea that those with criminal records suffer
from irreparable damage to their reputations. For instance, one federal district
court, in interpreting a Small Business Administration ("SBA") loan regulation
requiring a lending institution's examination of a prospective borrower's
"character" and "reputation," held that ex-offender status is an appropriate
proxy for character (or more precisely, the lack of character) and, thus,
creditworthiness. 4 9 The court upheld the defendant bank's refusal to lend to the
plaintiff despite the fact that his sole conviction had occurred a little more than
a decade before he applied for the loan and that he had been successfully
running his business without incident during that period.50
Any notion that the reputation of one bearing ex-offender status cannot
be rehabilitated results in ongoing punishment. Like other collateral
consequences, this type of ongoing punishment extends beyond the limit of any
period of incarceration or other sentence imposed by the court. In fact, in light
of the formal, judicial nature of ex-offender status attachment, such status
attachment bears the same official stamp as the traditional collateral
consequences imposed by non-judicial bodies. It is this official stamp-this
governmental conduct-that makes stigma attachment and the resulting
reputational damage ripe for takings analysis.
47 Discreditable individuals are often able to remain discreditable rather than become
discredited according to their ability to control the dissemination of information about their
stigmatizing attribute. PAGE, supra note 7, at 20-21. This is often accomplished through
attempting to "pass" as an unstigmatized person. See ALEXANDER, supra note 37, at 162-64
(describing the passing efforts of those bearing ex-offender status and their families). However,
the ability to remain discreditable rather than discredited has been whittled away by the advent of
the information age.
48 See discussion of collateral consequences supra Part II.A.
49 A.B. & S. Auto Serv., Inc. v. S. Shore Bank of Chi., 962 F. Supp. 1056, 1064 (N.D. Ill.
1997).
50 In response to the questions on SBA Form 912 Statement of Personal History, which asks
whether an applicant has been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of any criminal offense
other than minor traffic offenses, plaintiff responded that he had been charged with crimes on
five occasions, but had not been convicted of any of those crimes. Id. at 1058 (citing Def's
12(m) Statement T 12). The five arrests that plaintiff listed were (1) "domestic matters
(husband/wife)" at some point between 1982 and 1984; (2) possession of a controlled substance
in 1985; (3) disorderly conduct sometime between 1985 and 1990; (4) possession of a controlled
substance in 1990; and (5) possession of a stolen car in 1994. Id. (citing Def.'s 12(m) Statement
12). Plaintiff was convicted of aggravated battery for stabbing a man who plaintiff maintained
assaulted him and his wife.
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III. APPLYING A REGULATORY TAKINGS ANALYSIS TO THE REPUTATIONAL
DAMAGE SUFFERED BY THE PREVIOUSLY CONVICTED
Conventional takings claims require that the claimant identify three
elements: (1) the property involved; (2) the governmental conduct that has
resulted in a taking of the property identified; and (3) the just compensation to
which the claimant is entitled.5' These requirements apply equally to cases of
physical as well as regulatory takings. The government's regulation of the
previously convicted person's reputation can be likened to a regulatory taking
by "inverse condemnation." In traditional real estate-related physical takings
claims, a landowner may cite "inverse condemnation" where the government
has taken property or impacted property rights without utilizing the
condemnation process and, therefore, without providing just compensation for
the taking.52 Inverse condemnation, however, applies both to physical invasions
of private property and to so-called "regulatory takings"-those instances in
which the government has regulated the use of property in a manner so as to
constitute a constructive taking thereof. Although physical takings
jurisprudence may be instructive, the regulatory takings schema is more useful
in establishing the damage to reputation suffered by the previously convicted as
a violation of the Takings Clause. This is because damage to reputation as a
collateral consequence of conviction is the result of government regulation that
restricts property rights in a manner that significantly diminishes their value
and causes substantial, but, arguably, compensable harm to the affected
individual.
The genesis of the idea of the "regulatory taking" can be found in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon." The issue in Pennsylvania Coal was
whether the effect of the Kohler Act-which prohibited the mining of
anthracite coal in a manner that, among other things, would cause subsidence to
any residential structure-amounted to a taking. 54 The original action was
brought by homeowners who were seeking to prevent the Pennsylvania Coal
si See John Martinez, Wrongful Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting "Liberty-
Property, " 59 HASTINGS L.J. 515, 547 (2008).
52 Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty., 482 U.S. 304, 317 (1987)
("While the typical taking occurs when the government acts to condemn property in the exercise
of its power of eminent domain, the doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the
proposition that the taking may occur without such formal proceedings."). If the government
would like to acquire private property for public use, it must usually commence by attempting to
negotiate a purchase agreement with the owner. If its attempts at negotiation fail, it will begin the
condemnation process via the courts. At trial the government has to establish authority to
condemn, which may require it show that the proposed taking is 'necessary,"' thus establishing
its authority to condemn the property. If successful, the government will be required to pay just
compensation to the owner for the taking. See JESSIE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S.
ALEXANDER & MICHAEL H. SCHILL, PROPERTY 1081 (2010) (7th ed. 2010).
5 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
54 Id. at 412-13, 416-17.
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Company from mining under their property. The homeowners had purchased
the surface rights of the land in question from the Coal Company in 1878 via
deeds that expressly reserved to the Coal Company the right to remove coal
from the land. 56 Moreover, under the deeds, the plaintiffs had waived the right
to claim damages arising from the Coal Company's mining activities.57 The
Court noted that, "[a]s applied . . . , the [Kohler Act] is admitted to destroy
previously existing rights of property and contract"58 and queried "whether
police power can be stretched so far." 59
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., writing for the Court, reasoned
that, on the one hand, "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law." 6 0 However, on the other hand, he found that the
effect of the Kohler Act-abolishing the mineral rights for which the Coal
Company had contracted-was no small taking.6' Although the Act did not
actually take the Coal Company's ownership of the coal, it made it
impermissible to mine it.62 This, Justice Holmes wrote, had "very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying [the
coal]."6  Thus, he famously concluded that, "The general rule at least is that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking."6 The question left for future court decisions
was, "How far is too far?"
A takings analysis that analogizes the collateral consequence of stigma
attachment and continued reputational damage to an impermissible taking must
first establish reputation as cognizable private property under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Once reputation is established as property,
then the government conduct can be identified, not only as the attachment of
5s Id. at 412.
56 Id.
5 Id.
5 Id. at 413.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id at 414 ("On the other hand the extent of the taking is great.").
62 Id. at 412.
63 Id. at 414; cf id. at 417 (arguing that the coal had not in fact been destroyed because
"[c]oal in place is land" and further reasoning that "the right of the owner to use his land is not
absolute") (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
SId. at 415.
65 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, "[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONsr. amend. V. The Takings Clause
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of. . . property, without due process of law . . . .").
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stigma,66 but as the continued assault on reputation by the ongoing attachment
of stigma, even after one's sentence has been served (as expressed, for
example, by the assumption of unredeemable character).67 When this manner of
government regulation "goes too far,",68 then the resulting limits on liberty
amount to an impermissible regulatory taking for which just compensation is
due. 69
A. Critical Characteristics ofProperty and Reputation7 0
In her seminal Article Whiteness As Property, Cheryl Harris charts the
evolution of "whiteness" 7 from racial identity, to legal status, to property
interest. 72 Harris notes that whiteness-which she terms as a form of "status
property" 73-functions variously as "identity, status, and property, sometimes
singularly, sometimes in tandem." 74 By contrast, ex-offender status is, by
definition, a legal status. Rather than evolving from identity into legal status,
the evolutionary trajectory that it follows is from legal status to an aspect of
identity.75 It is this ex-offender identity, functioning "sometimes singularly,
sometimes in tandem," with ex-offender legal status that impacts the previously
convicted person's property interest in her reputation.
In her analysis of the critical characteristics of whiteness as property,
part of Harris's argument is that "[t]he reputation of being white was treated as
a species of property, or something in which a property interest could be
66 See discussion of stigma attachment supra Part II.B.
67 See discussion of A.B. & S. Auto Serv., Inc. v. S. Shore Bank of Chi., 962 F. Supp. 1056
(N.D. Ill. 1997) supra Part II.B.
68 As noted in the previous paragraph, Justice Holmes did not give specific guidance
regarding what going "too far" might consist of short of "appropriating or destroying" the
property in question. A preliminary discussion of what may constitute the government's going
"too far" in the context of regulating the use and rehabilitation of the reputations of those bearing
ex-offender status is contained in Part III.B. A more detailed exploration is reserved for a later
article.
69 260 U.S. at 415.
70 Part III.A. of this Article tracks the analysis employed by Harris in Part II.C. of her Article
establishing whiteness as property. For that reason, I have employed identical headings, where
appropriate, and slightly modified others where necessary. See Harris, supra note 16 at 1724-37.
n1 Harris defines "whiteness" as "the right to white identity as embraced by the law." Id. at
1726.
72 Id. at 1709, 1714.
7 Id. at 1714 ("Following the period of slavery and conquest [of Native Americans], white
identity became the basis of racialized privilege [a type of status in which white racial identity
provided the bases for allocating societal benefits ] that was ratified and legitimated in law as a
type of status property.") (emphasis added).
74 Id. at 1725.
7 See discussion of ex-offender status as a "master status" supra Part II.A.
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asserted." 6 She, therefore, concludes that this reputational interest in whiteness
is one of the reasons that it is a form of "status property."n In so arguing,
Harris takes note of the debate regarding whether reputation is more properly
cast as property or liberty, but decides that "[r]eputation is a 'melange' lending
itself to different descriptions over time."78 This Article follows the analysis
that Harris employed in exploring the property-like characteristics of whiteness,
but concludes that, rather than a "melange," reputation bears the same
characteristics as whiteness and, therefore, also qualifies as "status property."
For the layperson, the term "property" conjures up notions of land or
other tangible objects owned by natural persons.7 9 This, despite the
longstanding agreement by property theorists that "property" consists of rights
in things, rather than in the actual things themselves8 0 and the fact that, today,
most property rights are claimed with respect to intangible holdings.81 This
rights-oriented view of property makes it possible to conceive of property as
anything-tangible or intangible-"'to which a man may attach a value and
have a right."'
8 2 
,
From this rights-oriented standpoint, reputation displays the same
characteristics as other recognized intangible property, particularly other forms
of status property. Not surprisingly, the concept of reputation as immensely
valuable has been widely recognized across cultures and throughout time.83
76 Harris, supra note 16, at 1734.
77 Id.
7 Id. at 1735 n. 116 (citing Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law:
Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REv. 691, 740 (1986)).
7 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 12 (1993) ("In spite of the fact
that most holdings in today's society are intangible and the largest proportion of holdings are
owned by ... entities other than persons, the standard ideology of property stubbornly pictures
property as a tangible object ... owned by a natural person."); Harris, supra note 16, at 1724-25
("[B]y popular usage property describes 'things' owned by persons . . . .").
8o Harris, supra note 16, at 1724-25 (citations omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
PROPERTY ch. 1, intro. note (1936) ("The word 'property' is used in this Restatement to denote
legal relations between persons with respect to a thing."); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF
PROPERTY 16 (1990) ("[The legal conception] understands property as relations. More precisely,
property consists in certain relations, usually legal relations, among persons or other entities with
respect to things."); J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REv.
711, 712 (1996) ("The currently prevailing understanding of property ... is that property is best
understood as a 'bundle of rights."' (citations omitted)).
81 RADIN, supra note 79, at 12.
82 Harris, supra note 16, at 1726 (quoting 6 JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 101 (Gallard Hunt ed., 1906) (citing the classical Madisonian view of property)).
83 In both the Hebrew Bible and the Christian Biblical cannon, the Book of Proverbs puts it
this way: "A good name is more desirable than great riches; to be esteemed is better than silver or
gold." Proverbs 22:1 (New International Version). Likewise, the Book of Ecclesiastes touts
reputation's great worth: "A good name is better than fine perfume . . . ." Ecclesiastes 7:1 (New
International Version). Even outside of this religious context, the world's proverbs reflect the
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Thus, in order to make the next step, thereby firmly situating reputation in the
realm of property, it is necessary to address status as property (thus, "status
property"). Establishing reputation as "status property," then, allows one to
view it as consistent with the various theoretical conceptions of property.
1. Reputation as a Traditional Form of Property
The classical liberal view of property is that property ownership,
individuality and freedom are necessarily connected.84 This idea is reflected in
the personhood theory of property.85 In describing the personhood theory or
"property for personhood," Margaret Radin identifies two definitions of
property: (1) "object property" -that which "refers to an owned object ... or
to rights and duties of persons with respect to control of owned objects"; and
(2) "attribute-property"7-"an attribute . . . of a thing, concept, argument,
person, etc."8 Thus, as she so aptly puts it:
In the traditional liberal ideology of property, the two
meanings of the word property are also sometimes linked. If
value of reputation. For example, a Bengali proverb reads, "Better to die than to live on with a
bad reputation." THE MEDITATING CAT: BENGALI PROVERBS AND THEIR ECHOES IN OTHER
CULTURES 255 (Mondira Sinha-Ray, ed. 2011), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id-tP7FX4OP9-
IC&pg=PA255&dq=Better+to+die+than+to+live+on+with+a+bad+reputation&hl=en&sa=X&ei
=90rl Ucr5IorS9gS3n4CADA&ved=0CDUQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=Better/o20to%20die%20
than%20to%201ive%20on%20with%20a%20bad%20reputation&f=false. Likewise, Publilius
Syrus states, "A good reputation is more valuable than money." Publilius Syrus, Maxim 108, in
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF PASSAGES, PHRASES AND PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR
SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN LITERATURE 708 (9th ed. 1907), available at
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id-uva.x00 1 038207;view= I up; seq=730#view=lup;seq=730.
An Arabian proverb read, "When a door opens not to your knock, consider your reputation." THE
ROUTLEDGE BOOK OF WORLD PROVERBS 359 (Jon R. Stone ed. 2006), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=9b8LYmyjc-gC&pg=PA359&dq=When+a+door+opens+
not+to+your+knock,+consider+your+reputation&hl=en&sa=X&ei=eOvlUeGtJ4jY8gTRv4GoD
A&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=When%20a%20door/o20opens%20not%20to%20you
r/o20knock%2C%20consider/o20your/o20reputation&f-false. Lastly, a Swahili proverb reads,
"The stream may dry up, but retains the name." Swahili Proverbs: Methali za Kiswahili, CENTER
FOR AFRICAN STUDIES, UNIV. ILL. URBANA-CHAMPAIGN,
http://swahiliproverbs.afrst.illinois.edu/reputation.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
84 RADIN, supra note 79, at 6-7 ("The history of liberal property theory ... contributes to the
entrenched understanding that ownership is connected to individuality and freedom.").
85 The personhood theory of property and its relevance in justifying a measure of "just
compensation" in the form of "rebiography" for the previously convicted is examined in Part III
of this Article. Radin also notes that property as integral to liberty is also reflected in economic
theories of property: "This branch of liberal theory [economic theory] supports the law and
economics movement. In the economic view, private property is justified because it is necessary
to create ... incentives to productive activity" and "connects with a common understating that
freedom involves free markets." Id. at 7.
86 Id. at 191-92.
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private property is necessary for autonomy or liberty, and
autonomy or liberty is a necessary attribute of persons, then
property (object-aspect) is a property (attribute aspect) of
persons.. . . When property is a property of persons, my liberty
- 87is my property.
Reputation as property fits within this conception. As status and
identity merge, as has been the case with regard to ex-offender status, to create
the "master status"88 of the "ex-offender," 89 liberty is constrained as that status
impacts all aspects of life through the imposition of collateral consequences.
Ex-offender status, as a master status, also serves as a "negative credential" that
is officially bestowed upon its bearer (or carrier) by the criminal justice
system.90 Rather than "enabling access and upward mobility," as is the case
with positive credentials (such as college degrees and professional licenses and
certifications), "[n]egative credentials are those official markers that restrict
access and opportunity" 9 1-thus, they restrict personal liberty.92 Moreover,
because reputation itself can be classed as "status property," and ex-offender
status can be characterized as a "negative credential," ongoing attachment of
reputation marred by this negative credential represents one's having been "de-
propertied" 93 of beneficial reputation or the ability to rehabilitate poor
reputation post-incarceration.
Just as "[o]wning white identity as property affirmed the self-identity
and liberty of whites and, conversely, denied the self-identity and liberty of
Blacks," 9 4 "owning" the negative credential of reputation sullied by ex-offender
status denies the self-identity and liberty of the formerly incarcerated.
Moreover, as with whiteness, reputation as status property has the power to
grant "access to a whole set of public and private privileges that materially and
permanently guarantee[] basic subsistence needs and, therefore, survival[,]"
thus "increase[ing] the possibility of controlling critical aspects of one's life
rather than being the object of others' domination."95 Thus, reputation-as both
87 Id. at 194.
88 See definition of "master status" supra Part II.A. and note 33.
89 See supra note 8 discussing the pejorative nature of the term "ex-offender."
90 DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 32 (2007).
91 Id
92 Id. at 4 ("The 'credential' of the criminal record ... can be used to regulate access and
opportunity across numerous social, economic, and political domains.").
9 See Harris, supra note 16, at n.121 (discussing the effect of being "de-propertied" of
whiteness).
94 Id. at 1743; see also Mitchell F. Crusto, Blackness as Property: Sex, Race, Status, and
Wealth, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 51, 64-65 (2005).
9 Harris, supra note 16, at 1713. This idea is reflected in the very notion of collateral
consequences.
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"object property" and "attribute-property"-is intimately intertwined with
liberty.
2. Modem Views of Property as Defining Social Relations
In contrast to classical property theory, which defines property as that
to which value has been ascribed, modem property theory focuses on the
function of property and the social context surrounding that function. 9 6 As such,
many modem theorists see property rights ultimately as contingent, rather than
natural.9 7 As Harris notes, "[t]his construction directs attention toward issues of
relative power and social relations inherent in any definition of property."9 8
This notion is powerful in the context of the continued attachment of ex-
offender stigma through status, and in positioning reputation as property.
Property does not have meaning outside of society. 99 Therefore, as a master
status governed by collateral consequences, ex-offender status and its attendant
degraded reputation loses its meaning when removed from its social context
and when divorced from the function that such reputation performs in the daily
life of the person bearing ex-offender status.100 In its current social context,
however, ex-offender status functions as a stigmatizing "attribute-property,"
that proscribes the carrier's social, economic, and civic relations. Because it is
not naturally ascribed, but rather attached through negative credentialing, it fits
squarely within modem descriptions of property as a contingent creation of
government entities and of society.
3. Property and Expectations
Stephen Munzer notes that "[p]roperty . . . makes possible legal
expectations with respect to things."o'0 Harris opines that this theory "does not
suggest that all value or all expectations give rise to property, but those
expectations in tangible or intangible things that are valued and protected by
the law are property."' 02 Thus, the law's current recognition of the value of
reputation provides a strong case for the legal treatment of reputation as
96 Id. at 1728.
9 Id.
Id. at 1729.
99 See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 54 (2003)
("Property is under any conception, quintessentially and absolutely a social institution. Every
conception of property reflects .. . those choices that we-as a society-have made.").
100 See supra Part II.A discussing the collateral consequences faced by those with ex-offender
status.
1o1 MUNZER, supra note 80, at 29.
102 Harris, supra note 16, at 1729 (citations omitted).
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valuable status property. For example, in the area of torts, there is an interest in
reputation that is recognized in the cause of action for defamation.
A defamatory communication is one that "tends to harm the reputation
of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third
persons from associating or dealing with him."' 0 3 Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
writing for the majority in the landmark libel case of Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.' 0 4 remarked that "the individual's right to the protection of his own good
name 'reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and
worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of
ordered liberty."' 05 Moreover, injury to reputation has been deemed a
cognizable injury for standing purposes, thus satisfying the injury-in-fact
requirement.10 6
Certain defamatory statements are deemed actionable per se, thus
without proof of special harm.10 7 These include slanderous statements that one
is a carrier of a "loathsome disease," 08 that one has engaged in certain sexual
misconduct,109 or that one has committed a criminal offense."10 Certainly, the
defense to a claim of defamation remains that one's communication concerning
the complaining party is true. " Some, therefore, may argue that only the
wrongly accused or wrongly convicted should be able to avail themselves of
restored reputation." 2 However, for those actually convicted of a crime,
although they do not bear stigma in error, they nonetheless suffer from ongoing
reputational harm of the type routinely recognized by the law. The legal
treatment of reputation in one context, thus, creates a bridge of expectations of
property rights in reputation in other contexts. Therefore, even though property
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
104 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
105 Id. at 341 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. was a libel action brought by plaintiff against a magazine publisher in
response to an article describing plaintiff as a communist.
106 See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1987) (potential injury to plaintiffs reputation
was "distinct and palpable," and thus cognizable).
107 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 569-574 (1977).
"os Id. § 572.
109 Id. § 574.
0 Id. § 571.
"' See id. § 581A ("One who publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not subject to
liability for defamation if the statement is true.").
112 See, e.g., Wolitz, supra note 5, at 13 10 ("The courts do not have a freestanding obligation
to help out every ex-offender in vindicating his or her reputation . . . ."). See generally Martinez,
supra note 51 (arguing that takings jurisprudence should be used to justify compensating the
wrongly convicted).
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and expectations may not be fully equivalent, "expectations are part of the
psychological dimension of property."' 13
4. Property Functions of Reputation
The liberal view of property is represented by the prevailing Hohfeld-
Honore "bundle of rights analysis." 1 l4 In this view, property "includes the
exclusive rights of possession, use, and disposition"' 15 or alienability. When
one compares each of these "sticks" in the bundle of rights to the functions of
reputation, it becomes apparent that reputation is, in fact, property.
a. Rights of Disposition
Personal rights, such as rights in one's reputation, have usually been
considered inalienable.1 6 In this context, all of the recognized meanings of the
term "inalienable" apply: nontransferable, nonsaleable, nonrelinquishable,
etc." 7 Thus, in examining the property functions of reputation, alienability-or
more precisely the inalienability of reputation-seemingly poses a problem.
The law, however, already recognizes certain inalienable property, such as
entitlements, licenses, and degrees." 8 The foundation for the recognition of
status property as property, therefore, already exists despite the issue of
inalienability. Harris notes that in the case of whiteness, "its inalienability may
be more indicative of its perceived enhanced value, rather than its
113 Harris, supra note 16, at 1729 n.87 (citing MUNZER, supra note 80, at 30). The
reasonableness of these expectations-particularly the reasonableness of investment-backed
expectations based on a previously convicted person's investment in his or her own
rehabilitation-is discussed in depth in subsection B of this Part.
114 See Penner, supra note 80, at 712-13. Penner uses this term to describe the conflation of
Wesley N. Hohfeld's analysis of rights and the incidents of ownership delineated by A.M.
Honore.
115 Harris, supra note 16, at 1731 (citing JoHN S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL EcONOMY
bk. II, ch. ii, at 218 (W. Ashley ed., 1909)).
See, e.g., Harris, supra note 16, at 1731 ("Because fundamental personal rights are
commonly understood to be inalienable, it is problematic to view them as property interests.").
117 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1849-50
(1987) ("Sometimes inalienable means nontransferable; sometimes only nonsaleable. Sometimes
inalienable means nonrelinquishable by a rightholder; sometimes it refers to rights that cannot be
lost at all." (citations omitted)).
118 See Harris, supra note 16 at 1732 ("[E]ntitlements of the regulatory and welfare states,
such as transfer payments and government licenses, are inalienable; yet they have been
conceptualized and treated as property by law .... In the context of divorce, courts have held
that professional degrees and licenses held by one party and financed by the labor of the other is
marital property." (citations omitted)).
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disqualification as property.""'9 Arguably, this is true of all inalienable "status
property," including reputation.
b. Right to Use and Enjoyment
In the context of establishing the property functions of reputation, the
narrow definition of "use"-"refer[ring] to the owner's personal use and
enjoyment of the thing owned"-applies, as well as the other two incidents of
use identified by Honore: (1) the right to manage the manner in which the thing
owned is used and by whom it is used; and (2) the right to income as expressed
by reaping the benefit of said use.120 The importance of rights in the use and
enjoyment of one's reputation are reflected in the legal principles surrounding
goodwill, as well as some privacy-related claims. For example, although
"goodwill" commonly applies to that of a business or commercial enterprise
itself, it may also apply to "personal" or "professional" goodwill-that which
"is present when the unique expertise, reputation or relationships of an
individual give a business its intrinsic value."1 21 In either case, whether
classified as "business/enterprise" or "personal/professional," goodwill-
which is constituted in part by reputation-is commonly ascribed value. This
valuing of goodwill is essentially treating it (and its attendant reputational
component) as property.122
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "One who invades the
right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting harm" in cases
where there is (1) an "appropriation of the other's name or likeness"; or (2)
"publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the
public."l 2 3 The latter instance-invasion of privacy by giving publicity placing
"' Id. at 1734.
120 A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 116-17 (A.G. Guest
ed., 1961).
121 Darian M. Ibrahim, The Unique Benefits of Treating Personal Goodwill as Property in
Corporate Acquisitions, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2005).
122 See, e.g., id at 5-6 (arguing that business goodwill is already treated as property and that
personal goodwill is worthy of the same treatment). This treatment is operative in the context of
corporate mergers and acquisitions, as well as for other accounting and tax purposes. See
generally id.
123 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977); see also id. § 652C ("One who
appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of privacy."); § 652E ("One who gives publicity to a matter concerning
another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be
placed."). According to the Restatement, one's right of privacy is also invaded by: (1)
"unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another" and (2) "unreasonable publicity given to
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a person in false light-is related to defamation. As discussed earlier, the
relationship between the legal recognition of the value of reputation and the
expectation of rights in property is evidenced by the tort of defamation by libel
or slander. 12 4 In many false light claims, the invasion of privacy action is an
alternative grounds for recovery because the publicity given to the plaintiff is
itself defamatory and, therefore is actionable in libel or slander.1 25
In the former instance-invasion of property by appropriation of
another's name or likeness-the recognition of this form of tortious invasion of
privacy "confer[s] something analogous to a property right upon the individual"
whose likeness is appropriated.12 6 Although tortious appropriation of another's
likeness usually takes place in the context of one's appropriating the name or
likeness of another commercially for pecuniary gain, it does not always take
place in this context. That courts and legislatures have consistently provided
protection against such appropriation, even in instances where the benefit
derived is not monetary, indicates the value that is placed upon the use of
reputation as represented by one's persona.12 7
As "attribute-property," reputation, like other types of status property
,, 128(e.g., whiteness), can both be "experienced and deployed as a resource.
Those bearing ex-offender status do experience their status daily through the
imposition of the myriad collateral consequences effecting most meaningful
aspects of their lives. They are barred, however, from rehabilitating their
reputations in a manner that would allow them to deploy them as a beneficial
resource. Thus, once again, the potential value of this status property is
subverted in the ex-offender context.
c. The Absolute Right to Exclude
Harris notes that a "conceptual nucleus" of property is the right to
exclude, calling it a "critical characteristic of property." 29 She explains that
"[t]he possessors of whiteness were granted the legal right to exclude others
the other's private life." Id. § 652A. Invasion of privacy by these means is less impactful of
reputation.
124 See supra Part III.D.
125 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. b (1977).
126 Id. § 652A cmt. b; see also id. § 652C cmt. a ("[Tihe right created by it is in the nature of a
property right.").
127 See id. § 652C cmt. c ("In order that there may be liability under the rule stated in this
Section, the defendant must have appropriated to his own use or benefit the reputation, prestige,
social or commercial standing, public interest or other values of the plaintiffs name or likeness."
(emphasis added)).
128 Harris, supra note 16, at 1734.
129 Id. at 1714.
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from the privileges inhering in whiteness."130 The use and possession of
reputation, as earlier explained, adheres to this same principle of exclusion.
However, as a negative credential, ex-offender status and the attendant
damaged reputation represent a perversion of this concept: where one is able to
exclude others from appropriating or otherwise damaging one's good
reputation, in the context of ex-offender stigmatization, it is the possessor of the
negative credential who is being excluded from the possibility of acquiring
good or better reputation. In either case, it is clear that reputation, as status
property, presents opportunities for its possessor to avail herself of the absolute
right to exclude or to experience being excluded absolutely from its benefits.
B. Do the Regulation of the Reputations of the Previously Convicted,
Continued Attachment of Ex-Offender Stigma, and Ongoing
Reputational Damage "Go Too Far? "
As previously noted, establishing reputation as property is just the first
step in the regulatory takings analysis of the reputational damaged suffered by
those bearing ex-offender status.'31 One must also identify the public use
involved and determine whether the targeted regulation is in fact a taking. This
Section seeks to accomplish those goals by first identifying the public use
involved in this putative taking. Once the public use is identified, this Section
examines , reputational damage in light of the Pennsylvania Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York 32 multi-factor balancing test.
Alternatively, it endeavors to determine whether a per se taking has occurred.
1. Identifying the Public Use
The state's police power is exercised to protect the community's
health, safety, and morals.13 3 The Supreme Court has held that the Takings
Clause's public use requirement is "coterminous with the scope of the
sovereign's police powers." 3 4 Viewing "public use" and "police power" as
coterminous "do[es] away with serious judicial scrutiny of the public use
question." 35 This "public use" language has been interpreted to mean "public
130 Id. at 1736.
131 See supra Part III.
132 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
133 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); see James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public
Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 859, 862-63 (2004) (determining that just compensation would
still be due if the wording of the Takings Clause were, "nor shall private property be taken
pursuant to the police power, without just compensation").
134 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
135 Krier & Serkin, supra note 133, at 862-63.
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purpose," rather than actual use by the public. 136 The public purpose of the
various collateral consequences of incarceration, and likewise of the continued
attachment of ex-offender status, is usually identified as "public safety" and is,
thus, an exercise of the government's police power.'37
Historically, the state's exercise of its police power-including the
power to regulate public safety-provided it with a per se harm exception
defense, the result of which was that such exercise was not deemed a taking for
which just compensation is due.'38 However, the modem view of the Takings
Clause's public use requirement as coterminous with the state's police power
instead allows for the application of a Penn Central analysis in such cases.
Thus, whether one agrees with their use, the imposition of collateral
consequences, generally, and the stigmatization and reputational damage
visited upon the previously convicted, in particular, satisfy the public
use/public purpose requirement because they are instances of the government
exercising its police power with regard to public safety. Therefore, in this
analysis, what remains is the determination of whether such regulation "goes
too far."
An alternative view of the exercise of police power in the case of the
state's regulation of those bearing ex-offender status is that public safety is not
being protected, but rather is harmed by such regulation. Stigma literature
reveals that the continued labeling of individuals as "ex-offenders" contributes
to isolation and a failure to reintegrate, which is itself a public safety hazard in
that it contributes to recidivism.E9 Shame is a by-product or result of such
stigmatization. 14 0 It is the feeling of shame that causes the stigmatized person to
withdraw from full participation in civil society. Stigmatized individuals must
continually craft coping strategies to combat the wider population's reaction to
136 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479-80 (2005).
13 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.0111(1) (West 2013) ("The Legislature declares that a
goal of this state is to clearly identify the occupations from which ex-offenders are disqualified
based on the nature of their offenses . . . in a manner that serves to preserve and protect the ...
safety ... of the general public.").
13 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) ("A prohibition simply upon the
use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health,
morals, or safety of the community, cannot in any just sense, be deemed a taking."); see also
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 70 (1986) ("[T]he
outer limit of the police power has traditionally marked the line between noncompensable
regulation and compensable takings of property .... Legitimately exercised, the police power
requires no compensation." (emphasis in original)).
13 See infra notes 140-144.
140 See also GOFFMAN, supra note 36, at 7 (noting that shame results from the stigmatized
person's acceptance of the prevailing social attitudes regarding her stigmatizing attribute); but
see PAGE, supra note 7, at 17-18 (describing shame as an intermediate feeling between
embarrassment and stigma, but noting that the distinctions that he makes between the three are
"highly speculative").
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their stigma.141 These shame-driven strategies include silence, withdrawal from
social interaction, and often increased anti-social behavior. The shame-ridden
individual's defenses include both self-contempt and rage aimed at the outside
world. 14 2 This sense of rage and isolation is further heightened by the reactions
of others who may avoid the shamed individual due to their own discomfort
with that person's status.14 3 A continued cycle of shame, wherein the shamed
individual is given no hope of reconciliation with society creates pathology,
which in the penological context is expressed as recidivism.'
2. The Penn Central Multi-Factor Balancing Test
In an attempt to answer the question of when a regulation goes too far,
the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York
offered a three-part balancing test.145 In Penn Central, the owner of Grand
Central Terminal in New York City alleged that the city government's denial of
a permit allowing the owner to build a skyscraper atop the terminal was a
regulatory taking of its air rights.14 6 The Court disagreed with the owner, noting
that in making such determinations, it is necessary to focus on: (1) the character
of the regulation; (2) the extent of the law's interference with distinct
investment-backed expectations; and (3) the diminution in value of the property
resulting from the regulation.147 This same multi-factored balancing test can be
applied to the regulation of the reputations of those bearing ex-offender status.
a. Character of the Regulation
The Penn Central Court found that "[a] 'taking' may more readily be
found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government." 4 8 The easy case of physical invasion was further
clarified by the Court's opinion in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.14 9 In Loretto, the Court held that the New York law requiring landlords
141 See Becker & Arnold, supra note 40, at 49 (noting that "[s]tigmatized individuals find
themselves in a continual struggle with negative attitudes and with the devalued status that
accompanies them and must constantly develop strategies for dealing with the stigma").
142 See Pynchon, supra note 8, at 304.
143 See id.
'" See id. at 305 (explaining the process of reconciling a shamed individual to society by
means of an "interpersonal bridge" by which she is reaccepted after a period of shaming and/or
punishment).
145 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
146 Id. at 115-22.
147 Id. at 124-25.
148 Id. at 124.
149 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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to permit a cable television company to install equipment on the roofs of their
property and to run small cables down their buildings' exteriors amounted to a
taking.150 In so holding, the Court decided that any permanent physical
occupation of property is a per se taking, regardless of the public interest
served by the occupation. 151 Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the
majority, noted that the Court had "long considered a physical intrusion by
government to be a property restriction of an unusually serious character for
purposes of the Takings Clause .... [and] that when the physical intrusion
reaches the extreme form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has
occurred."1 5 2 He further contrasted "permanent physical occupation" with
"temporary physical invasion," noting that the former is always a taking, while
the latter may not always be.15 3 Thus, the Loretto Court added permanence to
the clear case of the physical invasion of property cited by the Penn Central
Court.
Because the reputation of the previously convicted person is intangible
property, it cannot be physically invaded by the government, like the landlords'
buildings in Loretto. However, as noted above, Loretto speaks, not just to the
physical nature of the invasion, but also to the permanence of the invasion
caused by the government regulation. Thus, if one considers the permanence of
damaged reputation, then the government's regulation of the reputations of the
previously convicted can, at least conceptually, be akin to such a per se taking.
b. Interference with Distinct Investment-Backed
Expectations of the Previously Convicted
An owner's investment-backed expectations as envisioned by the Penn
Central Court must be "distinct," rather than merely hypothetical.' 54 The Court
relied heavily upon Frank Michelman's influential work on takings in which he
intimated that such investment-backed expectation must be "distinctly
perceived [and] sharply crystallized." 55
Each previously convicted person has distinct investment-backed
expectations with regard to her investment in her own rehabilitation. These
investment-backed expectations are frustrated by ongoing damage to reputation
150 Id. at 421.
1' Id. at 426.
152 Id. (emphasis added).
153 See id. at n.12 (noting that such temporary invasions "are subject to a more complex
balancing process to determine whether they are a taking").
154 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also id. at 130
(finding no taking where owner merely believed it would have the future ability to exploit a
property interest in its building's airspace).
155 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation
of "Just Compensation " Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1233 (1967).
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and other collateral consequences. The case of Marc La Cloche illustrates this
point.
La Cloche served eleven years in prison for armed robbery before
being paroled in 2000.156 While incarcerated, he completed a drug rehabilitation
program, earned a high school diploma, and took courses qualifying him for an
apprentice barber's license.15 7 However, when La Cloche applied for the
apprentice license, the State of New York denied his application, citing a lack
of the requisite moral character because of his previous conviction.158 Over the
next five years, from 2000 until his death in 2005,"9 La Cloche fought this
denial.160 In his first administrative appeal, he won a short-lived battle and was
allowed to practice his trade for five months.1 6 1 However, the State appealed
the administrative law judge's decision to the Secretary of State who
summarily revoked La Cloche's license.16 2
In the ensuing years, rather than practicing the trade for which he
trained in prison, La Cloche attempted to prove his worthiness to do so by
amassing additional evidence of his good character and redeemed reputation in
the community.' 63  Without a doubt, La Cloche's investment-backed
expectation of making a living as a barber was frustrated by the imposition of a
collateral consequence that directly impugned his character and reputation. As
Justice Louis B. York of the Supreme Court, New York County commented,
"the State successfully rehabilitated a citizen and then vigorously fought to
deny him a right to live a rehabilitated life"l 64-the life that he expected to
lead.
156 La. Cloche v. Daniels, No. 403466/2003, 2006 WL 6861431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). La
Cloche's original sentence was 9-16 years. Id.
15 Id.
158 Id.
19 La Cloche won a posthumous moral victory. Justice Louis B. York of the Supreme Court,
New York County, in his opinion dismissing La Cloche's petition as moot due to his death, noted
that La Cloche had been rehabilitated and should have been issued a barbering license. See id.
160 id.
161 Id.
162 id.
163 See id. (noting that in a subsequent administrative hearing in 2003, "La Cloche submitted
overwhelming evidence of his good character and fitness for a barbering license," including
letters from his former employers at the salons at which he was briefly employed and from his
parole officer).
164 id
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c. Diminution in Value of the Reputational Status
Property of the Previously Convicted
Diminution in value is determined by comparing the value of the
subject property prior to the regulation with its post-regulation value. 165
However, the Penn Central Court held that diminution in the value of property
does not, by itself, constitute a taking.16 6 Rather, it must be analyzed in
conjunction with the owner's distinct investment-backed expectations. 16 7
One may argue that the reputations of those with criminal records are
damaged despite the imposition of collateral consequences and civil disabilities
that merely refer to that damaged character and reputation as justification for
their imposition. However, if such barriers were removed, an individual
reentering society after a period of incarceration would be allowed to rely on
any and all investment made in the rehabilitation of her reputation while in
prison and to add to that investment post-incarceration. Thus, the pre-regulation
value of the reputation of a previously convicted person would be limited only
by individual prejudice, which itself would be limited by (1) whether
knowledge of the conviction is discovered (i.e., whether the previously
convicted person becomes "discredited"); and, if discovered, (2) the importance
that each individual decision-maker places upon that knowledge. For instance,
in the case of Marc La Cloche, he would have, on the one hand, had the option
of not disclosing his past conviction to his employers. However, on the other
hand, as evidence by their letters in support of his being granted a barber's
license, those employers placed no negative importance on their knowledge of
his conviction. 16 Consequently, under both scenarios, La Cloche would not
have suffered a diminution in the value of his reputation and would have been
able to realize his investment-backed expectations regarding his post-prison
life.169
165 See Michelman, supra note 155, at 1232-33 (describing the 'fraction of value destroyed.'
test).
1 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
167 See Michelman, supra note 155, at 1233 (arguing that the diminution in value test queries
"whether or not the measure in question can easily be seen to have practically deprived the
claimant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation").
168 See La Cloche, 2006 WL 6861431 (reporting that, in his letter in support of the State's
licensing La Cloche as a barber, one former employee not only gave La Cloche a glowing
reference, but noted that La Cloche "would be his first choice to manage a second barber shop
should [he] open one").
169 These two scenarios may cause one to ask whether a previously convicted person who is
unable to garner the support that La Cloche was able to amass would not be able to claim a
taking because she had never rehabilitated her reputation in the eyes of the community. This
issue of the minimally rehabilitated person is addressed in Part III.B.3.
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3. Per Se Takings: Complete Deprivation of All Economically
Beneficial or Productive Use
The Supreme Court has supplemented the Penn Central multi-factor
balancing test with three specific per se takings rules. The first two: (1) the
permanent physical occupation rule as articulated in Loretto and (2) the harm
exception defense are discussed above.170 The remaining per se rule is that
regarding total wipeouts or a complete deprivation of all economic value.
The per se rule with regard to complete deprivation of all economically
valuable uses of property originates in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.17 ' The petitioner in Lucas purchased two beachfront lots in a
residential development on a barrier island situated off of the South Carolina
coast.17 2 His intention was to build homes on the lots.173 Prior to his doing so,
the South Carolina legislature, citing beach erosion and loss of wildlife habitat,
enacted legislation that prohibited additional beachfront development.174
Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia held that a taking occurs
"where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use" of the
property in question.'75 Therefore, if a total wipeout has occurred (i.e., 100%
diminution in value), then the other elements of the Penn Central test need not
be considered.' 7 1 Importantly, for the class of previously convicted persons
who have made no more investment in their rehabilitation than serving their
sentences, investment-backed expectations need not be considered. Rather, if
the status degradation suffered by their perpetually damaged reputations is
measured as a total wipeout, then it is a per se taking.'77
C. Just Compensation for Damage to Reputation
Over the past decade, reentry scholars have come to recognize the
value of "rebiography" in prisoner reentry.'7 8 From a philosophical standpoint,
170 See supra Parts III.B.2.a., III.B.1, respectively.
171 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
172 Id. at 1006-08.
173 Id. at 100647.
174 Id. at 1007-08.
1' Id at 1015.
176 id.
177 This argument will be most persuasive in jurisdictions that impose more far-reaching
collateral consequences than do others. Also, it must be noted that certain offenses (sex offenses,
for example) result in greater collateral consequences and, thus, the reputational damage suffered
by those with records of such offenses may be more likely to be measured as deprivations of all
productive use and value.
1 See, e.g., MARUNA, supra note 11, at 9-10 (citing "rebiographing" as integral to a
previously convicted person's efforts to "make good," which is defined as "find[ing] reason and
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rebiography allows the previously convicted person "to rewrite his or her
1079history to make it more in line with his or her present, reformed identity.
These scholars often quantify the value of rebiography in relation to its
usefulness in reducing recidivism. 80 However, given the previously convicted
person's reputational property interest, rebiography is also valuable in
providing a means of just compensation for the taking of that property. Just
compensation for a taking is measured in relationship to the economic damages
suffered by the complaining party.' 8 ' Economic damages exist in this
context; 82 however, actual payment may be inappropriate or at least difficult to
measure.183 After all, in the context of a taking of fungible property, receiving
money damages affords the complaining party the opportunity to purchase like
property-thus making him whole.18 4 One, however, cannot simply purchase
reputation, which is better characterized as personal or constitutive property.
Therefore, in the case of those not convicted in error, their ongoing reputational
damage is, therefore, better compensated by the proposed "rebiography
right"-an equitable remedy that would end the continuing injury. Thus, in the
context of reentry, the recognition of the previously convicted person's
reputation as valuable status property should trigger such a "rebiography right."
This right would, in essence, be a right to protect one's damaged reputation and
to reinvent one's post-incarceration self. Recognition of the value of reputation
leads one to the conclusion that the remedy for continued stigma attachment for
the previously convicted is restored reputation. This realization, however, leads
purpose in the bleakest of life histories"); PETERSILIA, supra note 10, at 219 ("[W]iping the slate
clean or allowing a 'legal rebiographing' is critical to offenders who have made the decision to
desist from crime.").
179 MARUNA, supra note 11, at 164.
180 See PETERSILIA, supra note 10, at 219; Nancy Leong, Felon Reenfranchisement: Political
Implications and Potential for Individual Rehabilitative Benefits 1, 25 (unpublished manuscript)
(cited with permission), available at https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/child-
page/266901/doc/slspublic/NLeong_06.pdf (arguing that "[b]y providing a means of civic
involvement, voting would allow felons to rebiography themselves and help create a vision of a
lawful life" (emphasis added)).
181 See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943) ("The Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Such compensation means the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property
taken. The owner is to be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his
property had not been taken." (internal footnote omitted)); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246,
254 (1934) (holding that "no private property shall be appropriated to public uses unless a full
and exact equivalent for it be returned to the owner" (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893))); see also discussion of assessment of required
compensation in traditional condemnation cases supra Part III.
182 See generally THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 6.
183 But see MARTINEZ, supra note 51, at 544, 549-54 (discussing payment for taking of the
"liberty-property" of the wrongly accused).
184 See RADIN, supra note 79, at 48.
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one to ask of what does a process of restored reputation consist? Moreover,
must the criminal justice system participate in such restoration and, if so, to
what extent should it participate?
IV. ESTABLISHING A "REBIOGRAPHY RIGHT" FOR THE PREVIOUSLY
CONVICTED AS JUST COMPENSATION FOR REGULATORY TAKING
In describing the personality theory or personhood perspective of
property, Margaret Radin noted that one's exerting control over property
through ownership is necessary for self-constitution or personhood.'85 Although
Radin was referring to the external environment from which tangible property
is traditionally derived, the principles of the personhood perspective can be
applied to intangible property such as reputation.'8 For instance, Radin
identifies the body as "the clearest case of property for personhood."' 8 ' Just as
the body is the clearest tangible case of property for personhood, reputation is
the clearest intangible case. The body is the tangible representation of the
person in the world. Likewise, reputation is the intangible representation
through which one is perceived by others.18 8
Radin identifies two types of property relationships that constitute the
"personhood dichotomy": (1) relationships regarding "personal" or
"constitutive" property and (2) relationships regarding "fungible" property.189
She notes, however, that property relationships are not perfectly
dichotomous. 190 Rather, they exist along a continuum ranging from wholly
"personal" to wholly "fungible." Thus, wholly personal property consists of "a
thing indispensable to someone's being,"l 9 1 while fully fungible property is "a
thing wholly interchangeable with money." 92 Reputation, which has evolved to
function as both identity and property,'9 3 necessarily resides on the "personal"
or "constitutive" end of the spectrum. This being so, it may even be said to
exist at the same point on the continuum as personal property-or at least at a
' See id. at 35 ("The premise underlying the personhood perspective is that ... to be a
person . . . an individual needs some control over resources in the external environment" and that
"[t]he necessary assurances of control take the form of property rights.").
18 See id. at 35 ("[T]he personhood perspective is often implicit in the connections that courts
and commentators find between property and privacy or between property and liberty.").
187 Id. at 48. Despite this pronouncement, Radin notes that "bodily integrity ... can be too
personal even to be thought of as 'property' without arousing great discomfort." Id. at 13.
188 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (defining "reputation").
189 RADIN, supra note 79, at 2, 53-55.
190 Id at 53 ("Many relationships between persons and things will fall somewhere in the
middle of this continuum.").
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 See discussion of the evolution of status from identity to property supra Part III.A.
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point that is markedly nearer to constitutive, personal property than to fungible
property. "Thus, the personhood perspective generates a hierarchy of
entitlements: The more closely connected with personhood, the stronger the
entitlement."l94 It then stands to reason that, per the personhood perspective,
reputation is worthy of greater protection than the public's interest in
information about the crimes committed by the reentering individual. Like the
lost tangible ob ject of personal property that is deemed "closely related to one's
personhood,"19 good reputation is also invaluable to its possessor. Thus, a
great measure of control over the shaping of one's reputation-embodied in a
"rebiography right"-should be afforded the reentering individual. 19 6 Such a
right would serve as just compensation for the taking that results from
identifiable government conduct: the continued attachment of stigma resulting
in the collateral consequence of ongoing reputational damage to those bearing
ex-offender status.
A. The "Rebiography Right": Judicial Process vs. Legislative Remedies
Even though this Article argues that the damaged reputation suffered
by the previously convicted amounts to a taking of property without just
compensation and thus, in theory should result in a claim at law, a statutory
remedy is more suitable for reasons of efficiency and practicality and in order
to conserve judicial resources. The large number of reentering individuals,'97 all
of whom suffer reputational damage as a collateral consequence of their
convictions, would glut the courts with their takings claims. Takings
jurisprudence, then, should function as a lens through which to focus needed
legislation. Additionally, rebiography should not take place via the courts
because, rather than achieving the desired result of the mitigation of stigma,
appearance in yet another public forum may amount to more of the same for the
previously convicted person. These concerns make the courts inadequate
vehicles for the purpose of compensating those bearing ex-offender status.' 98
194 RADIN, supra note 79, at 53.
195 Id. at 37. Radin cites the example of a wedding ring that is fungible property when in the
possession of a jeweler, but personal when in the possession of a "loving wearer." Id.
196 See id (arguing that, in the context of tangible things, the constitutive connection between
person and thing accord to the person "broad liberty with respect to control over that 'thing').
During 2011, more than 680,000 people were released from state and federal prisons. E.
ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 1 (Dec. 2012),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pl l.pdf.
198 One may argue that reentry courts may offer a mechanism by which formal restoration of
reputation can be achieved. Some reentry commentators have urged that the criminal justice
system adopt therapeutic justice models in the guise of reentry courts and, indeed, some
jurisdictions have done so. Such courts are among the various "problem-solving courts"-a
subtype of courts that includes drug courts and mental health courts, among others. See Eric J.
Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 417, 420-24 (2004)
528 [Vol. 116
32
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss2/4
2013] REGULATORY TAKINGS AND REPUTATIONAL DAMAGE
Scholars, particularly criminologists writing in the field of restorative
justice, have discussed the need for formalized recognition of rehabilitation (or
at least of one having paid one's debt to society and completed one's term of
punishment).'99 In response, some jurisdictions have begun to issue certificates
of rehabilitation.200 Some criminologists have even advocated for reentry
ceremonies, arguing that one is convicted in ceremonial style and should,
therefore, be released in the same way.2 0 1 Certificates of rehabilitation,
however, pose a similar problem to reentry courts in that the use of them
requires one to disclose that she has a criminal history. Nondisclosure and a
right that functions automatically are also more desirable because such
measures lessen the chance of causing the previously convicted person more
discredit.
B. A Brief Examination of the British Rehabilitation of Offenders Act of
1974-A Practical Example ofRebiography
The framework for the rebiography right can be modeled after the
relief contained in the British 1974 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act
("ROA").202 Per the ROA, the history of certain criminal offenses is "spent"
after a period of a number of years.203 The ROA, however, only applies to
(discussing the genesis of drug and reentry courts). The specialized function of the reentry court
is to monitor the reentry process, providing support to parolees and other reentering individuals.
See id at 417 (describing reentry courts as designed to intervene at the "output-end of the
[incarceration] cycle ... to supervise prisoners on parole or supervised released upon their return
to the community"). In their current incarnations, these therapeutic, problem-solving courts can
be problematic in that they raise concerns regarding both possible due process violations and the
appropriate role of the judiciary. See Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the
False Promise of Judicial Interventionism, 65 OHIo ST. L.J. 1479, 1494-95, 1517 (2004). See
generally Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to Professor Wexler's Warm Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Invitation to the Criminal Defense Bar: Unable to Join You, Already (Somewhat Similarly)
Engaged, 48 B.C. L. REV. 539 (2007). As a subset of problem-solving courts, reentry courts are
not immune to these concerns. And as a subset of courts generally, reentry courts are not immune
to the other concerns expressed in this Part IV.A.
199 See MARUNA, supra note 11, at 155-58 (documenting previously convicted individual's
need to be recognized as successful in their desistance from crime); PETERSILIA, supra note 10, at
208 ("[D]esisters . . . desperately need outside validation . . . .").
200 For example, New York, Illinois, Connecticut, California, Nevada, New Jersey. See
Margaret Love & April Frazier, Certificates of Rehabilitation and Other Forms of Relief from the
Collateral Consequences of: A Survey of State Laws (Oct. 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CR203000/otherlinksfiles/
convictionsurvey.pdf.
201 See, e.g., MARUNA, supra note 11, at 162-64; PETERSILIA, supra note 10, at 206-11;
Travis, supra note 19, at 268-70.
202 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 1974, c. 53 (Eng.).
203 Id
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minor offenses. The history of a particular offense expires according to its type
and the length of the originally imposed sentence.20 4
The practical effect of one's having a "spent" conviction is that, barring
certain exceptions, once spent, the conviction need not be disclosed in any
context, including on employment and insurance applications or in civil
proceedings. In such instances, when asked directly whether he or she has been
convicted of a crime, the person with a spent conviction may legally answer in
the negative.2 0 5 The ROA does, however, have certain limitations: prison
sentences in excess of two and one-half years can never be spent; moreover,
those applying for jobs in certain professions must disclose their convictions,
even if spent.20 6
A rebiography right that is given as just compensation for the
continued taking of reputational status property can take the ROA as a model
point of departure. However, while the ROA limits the scope of those able to
avail themselves of its provisions, the reach of the rebiography right should
extend to cover a broader population of previously convicted persons.
The idea of rebiography is not totally foreign to the American legal
system. There are, in fact, parallels between rebiography in the British legal
system under the ROA and the rebiography that is institutionalized in certain
areas of U.S. law. In particular, the sealing of juvenile justice records and the
expiration of negative credit histories in the bankruptcy context incorporate
what amounts to rebiography.207 Why do we do this in these contexts? It is
because, for certain classes of people, forgiveness is part of the judicial system.
Criminologist Shadd Maruna puts it this way: "[T]he United States permits
204 For example, the convictions of adult offenders, those eighteen years of age or older at the
time of convictions, sentenced to terms of imprisonment up to six months are spent after seven
years; the convictions of those with terms of imprisonment over six months, but less than thirty
months, become spent after ten years. The corresponding time periods are five and seven years,
respectively, for offenders under age eighteen. Id. § 5, Tables A-B.
205 See MARUNA, supra note 11, at 164; see also Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 1974, c. 53.
(Eng.).
206 For example, the following professionals are among those who must disclose spent
convictions: financial professionals (accountants, actuaries, securities dealers, etc.), medical
professionals (doctors, dentists, nurses, midwives, psychologists, etc.), and legal professionals
(lawyers, court officers, judicial appointees). Rehabilitation of Offenders Act (Exceptions) Order,
1975, No 1023, Sch. 1 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1975/1023/contents/made. The ROA also has broad
exceptions for non-specified occupations involving certain tasks such as the management of
nursing homes or working in certain locations such as school or at places that provide care to
"vulnerable adults." Id. For this reason, the National Council for Civil Liberties (aka "Liberty"),
a British civil and human rights organization notes that ROA is often criticized for its many
exceptions. Rachel Robinson & Daren Hlaing, Liberty's Response to the Ministry of Justice's
Proposals on the Effective Punishment, Rehabilitation and Sentencing of Offenders 6 (Mar.
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.1iberty-human-
rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy 1 l/response-to-moj-breaking-the-cycle-consultation-march-2011 .pdf.
207 See MARUNA, supra note 11, at 164.
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more than a little selective amnesia or autobiographical creativity if the
individual is a member of a class of people we believe in-a juvenile [or] a
debtor... .,,208 He notes that this benefit is not extended to "common
criminals."20 9 Martuna goes on to warn that "[t]his selective application of the
'forgive and forget' doctrine can recreate the supposed dichotomy between Us
and Them." 2 10
C. Weighing the Rebiography Right Against Public Safety
There is an undeniable tension in balancing public safety against
"rebiography." On the one hand, the individual seeks to control information in
order to avoid being discredited and publically branded with the stigma of ex-
offender status. If successful, the individual will ensure a measure of liberty
and autonomy by managing the way in which she is portrayed to others-by
managing her reputation. This is the crux of the interest involved in a
"rebiography right." The State, however, has a public safety interest in
identifying those who have committed crimes and, arguably, may commit
crimes in the future. Thus, the State, on the other hand, seeks to make the same
personal information accessible in order to promote public safety by
circumscribing self-governing behavior by those who bear ex-offender status.
In other words, the actions of the State are aimed at ensuring that the those
bearing ex-offender status become discredited.21 1
Which interest should prevail? Laura Underkuffler opined, "If the right
to control personal information is a cognizable property right, it should ... be
afforded strong presumptive power."212 According to this reasoning, a
previously convicted person's interest in the protection of his reputation (status
property) should eclipse any collective interest in public safety manifested in
the current practice of providing nearly unfettered access to criminal records.
By thinking of damage to reputation as a taking, the protection of reputation
constitutionally outweighs any public safety concerns, which are merely policy
issues. Under this analysis, the person bearing ex-offender status has a
constitutional right to have her reputational taking justly compensated.
208 id
209 id
210 id
211 See generally UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 99, at 108-09 (discussing the tension between
personal liberty and governmental interest and the intersection of personal autonomy and
governmental restrain thereof in the context of the use of individual DNA profiles by government
agencies).
212 1d. at 109.
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V. CONCLUSION
Given the seeming permanence of status degradation, restoration is
necessary-and must be formalized. In the case of the previously convicted,
their stigmatization is officially bestowed upon them by the criminal justice
system as punishment for criminally sanctioned conduct. As such, the stigma of
ex-offender status is particularly far-reaching, and difficult to overcome given
the power of the stigmatizer-the federal, state or local government.213 When
this official stigmatization is coupled with any other stigmatizing attributes that
an individual previously convicted person may have, the effect on his ability to
214
successfully reintegrate post-conviction can be devastating. However, despite
the current negative and on-going nature of ex-offender stigma, we must be
mindful of the fact that stigma is at its root a social construct. 215 It follows then,
that because stigma is constructed, a particular stigma, even a conduct stigma,
can be dismantled, thereby "destigmatizing" the individual who previously
carried that stigma.216 This is particularly true if the destigmatizing is led by the
original stigmatizer-a governmental entity such as a legislative body. For the
individual bearing ex-offender status, this necessarily means that the same
government that officially stigmatized him must participate in removing the
stigma from him. Applying a takings analysis to the problem of the ongoing
213 See PAGE, supra note 7, at 10-11 (noting that "official labeling ... tends to create more
problems for an individual than 'lay' labeling.").
214 See Becker & Arnold, supra note 40, at 47 (noting the compounded effect of multiple
stigmas, i.e., blackness in a white dominated culture or femaleness in a male-dominated culture).
See generally Regina Austin, "The Shame of it All": Stigma and the Political
Disenfranchisement of Formerly Convicted and Incarcerated Persons, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 173, 174-85 (2004) (discussing "the impact of the stigma of conviction and incarceration as
experienced not only by minority offenders, but also by their families and communities, and the
relationship of that stigma to political disenfranchisement").
215 See generally Becker & Arnold, supra note 40, at 39-57 (arguing that stigma is best
understood in the sociohistorical and cultural context in which the individual experiences it);
STEVEN C. AINLAY ET AL., Stigma Reconsidered, in THE DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE 1, 3-6 (noting
the ambiguous nature of stigma and the process of stigmatization as being a function of both
culture and time period).
216 "Destigmatization" must be distinguished from "normalization," which is the process by
which "stigmatized individuals adapt themselves to society by attempting to reduce their variance
from cultural norms." Becker & Arnold, supra note 40, at 50-51. "Passing" (attempting to appear
"normal" or unstigmatized) and "covering" (attempting to reduce tension during social
interactions) are forms of normalization or stigma management. See PAGE, supra note 7, at 20-24
(defining the terms "passing" and "covering"); see also ALEXANDER, supra note 37, at 162-64
(applying the term "passing" to the efforts of the previously convicted and their families to keep
their status secret). Whereas destigmatization does not seek to obscure or minimize a
population's or individual's stigmatizing attribute, but instead seeks to persuade society and the
stigmatizer to redesignate the stigmatizing attribute as non-stigmatizing either as it is carried by
the general population or non-stigmatizing as carried by a particular individual.
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reputational damage suffered by those with criminal histories provides a
framework for such participation.
Destigmatization, though possible, is not effectuated overnight even if
the original stigmatizer provides the catalyst for destigmatization. 2 17 An official
process is just the first step in the process and will, hopefully, result in a shift in
attitudes and "reactive norms"218 and thus a gradual reacceptance and
reintegration of the stigmatized individual-here the previously convicted
person-into society.
217 See AINLAY, supra note 215, at 5 (discussing the gradual nature of the destigmatization
process); see also Stafford & Scott, supra note 35, at 91 ("If stigmas involve norms, then
destigmatization would require a major overhaul of our normative system.").
218 "[R]eactive norm[s]" are the "shared beliefs about how people should react" to a given
stigma. Stafford & Scott, supra note 35, at 89 (citing Alexander L. Clark & Jack P. Gibbs, Social
Control: A Reformulation, in SOCIAL PROBLEMS 12, 398-415 (1965)).
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